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Ecocriticism emphasizes how our bodily and ecological boundaries are just as 
porous, inter-penetrable, and open as are our cultural and linguistic realms. As individual 
bodies and communities, we are fully immersed in our material environment and 
participating in constant exchanges of matter and energy. Highlighting open boundaries 
and the material flows in which we participate contests the subject-based assertions that 
we are primarily self-enclosed, self-determining individuals whose external surroundings 
are relatively insignificant compared to our deep, inner worlds. The notion of a closed 
subject assumes that bodily boundaries are only intentionally penetrable, thereby 
overlooking the many substances such as air, water, food, but also toxic materials that 
regularly, if not continuously, enter and exit our bodies. In this essay, I nevertheless 
advocate for a cautious approach to the ecocritical question of boundaries. This 
approach acknowledges the ongoing transformations and exchanges of matter and energy 
through all bodies, environments, and ecosystems, yet it also attests to the obvious fact 
that boundaries, in some form, are requisite for organic life as we know it.1 I therefore 
propose another approach when viewing the question of entangled material bodies, 
minds, and their environments, one acknowledging membranes yet also building on 
Stacy Alaimo’s notion of “trans-corporeality.” That is, we individuals are neither fully 
bounded, self-determining subjects, nor are we fully open, “vibrant bodies pulsing in 
harmony with their environments,” as Louise Westling claims (36).  Instead, bodies, like 
our subjectivities, are necessarily in disharmony with their environments, existing as 
complex nexuses of shifting, intra-acting membranes that maintain temperature and 
chemical differences as well as some kind of bodily form requisite for individual living 
beings. Yet, at the same time, bodies and minds exist only in relation to their species and 
co-species, other life forms, and their materiality. Furthermore, boundaries are not 
always where one expects them, and our subjective, cultural, and political assumptions 
                                                       
1 Additionally, the quest for the eradicating boundaries echoes aspects of the political and economic call 
for “the free and open markets” associated with capitalistic globalization. Indeed, Vandana Shiva and 
other international scholars have made that claim regarding the “opening” of new markets worldwide as 
well as the genetic engineering across species. Shiva writes in Stolen Harvest: “Do the boundaries 
between species have integrity? Or are these boundaries mere constructs that should be broken for human 
convenience? The call to ‘transgress boundaries’ advocated by both patriarchal capitalists and 
postmodern feminists cannot be so simple. It needs to be based on a sophisticated and complex 
discrimination between different kinds of boundaries, an understanding of whom is protected by what 
boundaries and whose freedom is achieved by what transgressions” (Shiva, 57). See also Patrick 
Murphy’s discussion of international and ecological “borders” in Ecocritical Explorations.  
V
ol 2, N
o 2 
Author: Sullivan, Heather I.;  Title: Nature in a Box: Ecocriticism, Goethe’s Ironic Werther, 
and Unbalanced Nature 
 
229 
© Ecozon@ 2011     ISSN 2171-9594 
regarding the limits of our physical and mental selves are highly contested.  An 
ecologically-informed perspective for ecocriticism hence should strive to maintain 
simultaneously a sense of open and closed boundaries and re-conceptualize them as part 
of dynamic, evolving, and very “unbalanced nature.” This essay applies such a 
perspective to Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s “ironic Werther,” who emerges from the 
juxtaposition of Goethe’s boundary-busting nature novel Werther with his satirical 
comedy thereof, The Triumph of Sentimentality. The protagonist in Triumph seeks 
containment of nature in a box, whereas Werther longs to erase all bounds and be 
immersed in nature, even to “be nature” as a bug. I then relate the ironic Werther to 
Timothy Morton’s celebration of “radical openness” in The Ecological Thought in order 
to assess the advantages of maintaining some boundaries in our ecocritical wanderings.  
Rethinking boundaries brings an awareness that nature’s borders are in flux, even 
though specific life forms do exist in specific ecological niches. A long-term and broad 
view of the biosphere through eons of time demonstrates that nature is not a static place 
in contrast to the radical changes and “progress” of human culture. Rather, balance is an 
issue of scale. In fact, there is an increased ecological emphasis on “unbalanced nature” 
that replaces outdated notions of nature’s holistic stability, as John Kricher describes in 
The Balance of Nature: Ecology’s Enduring Myth. Kricher debunks the long-held values 
of balanced nature, stasis, and climax states: “The balance of nature paradigm is of little 
value within evolution and ecology. It has never been clearly defined and is basically 
misleading. But the balance of nature is esthetically pleasing, a fact that is largely 
responsible for its continued vigor through the ages” (Kricher 23). Furthermore, Kricher 
notes that the balance of nature is a teleological belief system wherein all parts fit neatly 
together in their place as if by design. This belief system is not scientific, though it has 
long been included in ecological theories and its siren call still reverberates in many 
environmental discussions. It is a challenge not to see the tremendous beauty and 
seeming longevity of natural landscapes as sites of harmony and stability in contrast to 
radical and rapid human changes. Yet even though the anthropogenic devastation of so 
many ecosystems is taking place at an unprecedented pace, that does not mean that 
nature has only recently, and only because of us, become unbalanced. The particular 
form of these changes is different, but not the imbalance.  
The necessity of rejecting the reigning notion of balanced nature has been noted 
in ecocriticism, particularly by the ecocritics Ursula Heise in Sense of Place, Sense of 
Planet, Greg Garrard in Ecocriticism, and Dana Phillips in The Truth of Ecology. All 
three cite the ecologist Daniel Botkin’s 1990 Discordant Harmonies, which, like 
Kricher’s more recent work, describes the prevalent yet fallacious belief in balanced 
nature as a utopian continuity. Heise quickly dispatches with the notion of “global 
ecology as harmonious, balanced, and self-regenerating,” notes Botkin’s rejection of 
orderly, steady-state ecological systems, and declares that this has “momentous 
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consequences for environmental literature and ecocriticism” (Heise 64, 65). Garrard 
discusses the image of stable, enduring nature as a fall-back to pastoral visions that 
resonate in the outmoded ideas of succession and climax states. Phillips writes that:  
 
ecology has come to be identified in the popular mind with such values as balance, harmony, 
unity, purity, health, and economy. It’s fair to say that many people regard these values, 
however utopian they may be, as all but indisputable and as all but synonymous with the very 
word ‘ecology.’ Few laypersons dare to question these values publicly, and imagery expressing 
our collective devotion to them, and indeed to everything green, pervades our daily lives. 
(Phillips 42) 
 
Yet if we reject the tidy contrast between the pastoral images of harmoniously stable 
nature existing in opposition to frenetically “developing/progressing” humanity, if we 
begin, in other words, with nature that has been unbalanced all along, then we face a 
considerable challenge: how do we address our radical alterations to environments 
without longing for a stability to which we might “return”? How do we also counter the 
claims that our disruptions are therefore irrelevant or merely part of larger patterns of 
change? Formulating ecological strategies based on unbalanced nature alters our 
fundamental understanding of environmental questions; it shifts the ground, and 
destabilizes our green agendas for balance with nature. It is nevertheless necessary to 
avoid erroneous solutions. Unbalanced nature means long-term fluxes, ongoing formation 
and destruction, and, as Kricher says, evolution and geological processes. He stresses 
that nature is dynamic, not static, and boundaries are short-term: “If a habitat, any 
habitat, is left alone, protected, with nothing done to it, it will nonetheless eventually 
exhibit change. Change is inevitable because eventually some form of natural disturbance 
will occur, climate may alter, new species will invade, extant species will drop out” 
(Kricher 91). Nature’s dynamic forms function, according to Kricher, as fluid species 
and habitats that emerge briefly in response to some kind of boundary delineations.  
Negotiating amongst the cultural delineations and the ecological, or biological 
boundaries of our material bodies as part of unbalanced nature is a tricky business, but 
one literary model for envisioning this process is provided by the juxtaposition of 
Goethe’s famously sentimental The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) with his less 
well-known play that satirizes Werther, Triumph of Sentimentality (1777). Indeed, I 
claim that one cannot derive an accurate sense of how Goethe views “nature” without 
reading both texts together. If Werther sings sentimental praises of nature much like a 
prototypical ecocritic desiring to see nature, be nature, and to erase all boundaries, 
including those between bodies, nature’s teeming life forms (especially insects), as well 
of as those that divide classes, lovers, and bodies, then Prince Oronaro in Triumph seeks 
quite the opposite, which is to say he hopes to keep nature under control and in a box.  
Oronaro loves nature, but finds it much too fluctuating, unbalanced, and bug-ridden, so 
he refuses to go outside and revels instead in a nature room safe within his castle. For 
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travel, he has boxes to carry “nature” with him everywhere. He also safely concentrates 
his love on a puppet girl whose body is literally stuffed with sentimental literature 
thereby avoiding the greater bodily challenges of actual intra-actions with natural and 
feminine bodies. Werther, on the other hand, constantly wanders outdoors through the 
elements, and pines for a real girl, Lotte. Overcome with the sentimentality of 
Klopstock and the Storm and Stress, he desires the opening of bodies and minds to each 
other, until he finally chooses the radical solution of a suicidal shot to the head in a 
gesture that unfortunately opens his mind once and for all to the world, and 
presumably, to nature.  His quest for boundless connection leads to fatal ruptures.  
Werther’s fellow nature worshipper, Oronaro, chooses the opposite path and 
seeks instead containment strategies. Every evening when travelling, he unpacks his 
beloved puppet along with his “nature in a box,” creating a nature grotto in a designated 
room.  Goethe’s Triumph derives its energy from this problem of containment. This 
scene of boxes is paralleled by another enactment of intense containment: the stand-
alone monodrama in Act IV that mournfully stages the sufferings of Prosperina trapped 
in the barren landscapes of hell, longing for escape and some decent greenery and 
gardens. This is performed by the queen who has fallen for Oronaro’s effusive 
sentimentality, much to her husband’s dismay. Triumph’s containment of nature’s 
landscapes also contain and imprison the figures; this is in stark contrast to the wild 
storms and flooding rivers that destroy landscape forms and embody openness in 
Werther. Together the two Goethean texts provide us with ironic sentimentality about 
our very real material entanglements in the world, and suggest that, if nothing else, there 
is confusion with regard to “nature” about boundaries, where they are, who or what 
determines them, and what happens when one believes whole-heartedly in one’s own 
ability to create them or destroy them at whim.  
It is obvious to point out that Goethe’s Werther is about nature, but it is only 
part of the story. For one thing, reading Werther’s nature revelry ironically helps expose 
his longing to be an insect, an overlooked yet significant issue. Additionally, the novel’s 
effusive nature-fever is most often read alone, without reference to The Triumph of 
Sentimentality, despite the fact that it is Goethe’s direct reflection on his world-famous 
best-seller.2 For our question of boundaries, the juxtaposition of Werther and Triumph 
is the most productive means for gaining understanding of Goethe’s views on nature, 
and his “ironic aesthetics,” as Astrida Tantillo notes. She reads Werther alongside 
Triumph, and analyzes both of them as a critique of Rousseauian nature worship. 
                                                       
2 Much of the scholarship on Goethe’s Werther overlooks the lesser-known satire, and thus reads the 
novel alone as a monolithic assertion of modernity, sentimentality, the middle-class, or the relationship 
of nature to art. Most readings also neglect the other texts Goethe wrote relating to Werther such as the 
“prequel” to the novel, Werther’s Travels (mostly known as “Letters from Switzerland”), written later. 
Hans Rudolf Vaget discusses the many Werther texts together, reading Werther as the “undead” that 
haunts Goethe throughout his life as a reflection of his own uncontained creativity 
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Tantillo’s notion of the “ironic aesthetic,” by which she means the thinker who “refuses 
to allow a simple or unified interpretation of a work of art” describes Goethe as author 
generally, and it is also relevant for ironic ecocritical readings of boundaries (Tantillo, 
2001, 453).3  Tantillo contrasts the “ironic aesthetic” and his/her complex, multivalent 
views to the “sentimental aesthetic” like Werther and some ecocritics, who demand 
harmonious, unified interpretations of texts and nature. In this essay, I use the ironic 
aesthetic’s insistence on multiple views in order to uphold a perspective of open and 
closed boundaries in ecocriticism. This view puts the two texts on a spectrum, so that 
we can see on the one end the intense rhapsody and free-flowing immersion into the 
“all,” and on the other end, the parody as a quest for containment and control with 
boxes.  
Similarly, neither the issue of Goethe as Germany’s “nature poet” nor the issue 
of our contested bodily, environmental, and subject boundaries can be limited to one end 
of the spectrum or to a singular, static position.4 Goethe specifically stresses irony as 
inherently necessary when seriously approaching nature. In his self-proclaimed 
scientific masterpiece, Towards a Theory of Color, he declares that some irony is 
imperative to avoid abstraction and uncontained theorizing that can blind us to our own 
assumptions.5 Goethe’s “irony” is hence a form of self-awareness and an attempt to see 
beyond our own ideological, aesthetic, and subjective frameworks; it is an openness to 
various viewpoints. For ecocriticism, such irony with regard to boundaries is crucial in 
that we must simultaneously negotiate with serious ecological limits (that are denied by 
current economic practices) and yet also our own porosity and transcorporeality as 
bodies existing in open flows with our surroundings. The challenges of calling for limits 
to our environmental impact while also asserting limitless connections and inter- and 
intra-penetration requires careful consideration. At the very least, ecocriticism would 
benefit from the recognition that boundaries, whether contested, constructed, or life-
containing, are, indeed, a vital issue.  
                                                       
3 Tantillo’s ironic approach to Goethe’s texts stands in contrast to more traditional readings that tend to 
interpret Werther as an autobiographical extension of Goethe. Other authors who similarly emphasize the 
novel’s irony include Duncan, Grathoff, Kuzniar, Lange, Leidner, Prier, and AUTHOR; however these 
authors concentrate on the novel’s internal irony rather than how it relates to Goethe’s satire of his own 
sentimentality. Tantillo’s 2001 essay stresses the insights of this cross-fertilization, and her recent 
Goethe’s Modernisms demonstrates again the benefits of multiple perspectives for reading Goethe. 
4 As Goodbody notes, Goethe’s significance with regard to nature for German culture is equivalent to 
Thoreau’s in American studies. Goodbody’s book on ecocriticism discusses 20th-century German 
literature, but includes a chapter on Goethe as “ecophilosophical inspiration.”  
5 Goethe strongly advocates against observations of nature that begin with a theory instead of with the 
observed phenomenon; he suggests irony to avoid abstract theorizing. “Jedes Ansehen geht über in ein 
Betrachten, jedes Betrachten in ein Sinnen, jedes Sinnen in ein Verknüpfen, und so kann man sagen, daß 
wir schon bei jedem aufmerksamen Blick in die Welt theoretisieren. Dieses aber mit Bewußtsein, mit 
Selbstkenntnis, mit Freiheit, und um uns eines gewagten Wortes zu bedienen, mit Ironie zu tun und 
vorzunehmen” provides the best possible results. (Goethe, Theory of Color, 14, English translation 
mine). 
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For Werther, boundaries are the problem. He loves nature completely and 
without irony; he savors it, sees it as a vast interconnected weave, and as an all-
encompassing flow in which he longs to dissolve. Despite the many readings of “nature” 
in Werther as an internal mirroring of the sentimental self, 6 I suggest following Goethe’s 
lifelong scientific studies that attribute an intense “agency” and resonance to nature as 
something materially present beyond the self. Nature is the active world of physical 
materiality in which Werther exists, one in which the elements drive the flux and flow of 
weather and energy exchanges, and one which forms him as much as he shapes it. Early 
on in the novel, this means an inspired revelry: “This confirmed me in my resolution of 
adhering in the future entirely to Nature. Nature alone is inexhaustible and can form the 
great artist” (Goethe, Werther 11). Later, once he feels oppressed by cultural norms and 
Lotte’s marriage to Albert, Werther again speaks of an overwhelmingly active nature, 
though now as a fearsome, destructive force: “My heart is wasted by the thought of 
that destructive power which lies latent in every part of universal Nature. Nature has 
formed nothing that does not destroy itself, and everything near it. And so, surrounded 
by earth and air and all the active forces, I stagger on in sheer anxiety” (Goethe, Werther, 
37). Nature here is a power driving Werther onwards and “forming” him. His final turn 
to suicide occurs in part because he cannot close himself to outside influences, whether 
natural or cultural. He is wildly open to the world, with disastrous results. 
Werther’s openness is offset by the novel’s epistolary form, which is 
uncharacteristically “closed”: it famously presents only Werther’s writings and thus 
stands primarily as an extended monologue with only brief comments from the editor at 
the beginning and a few notes and thoughts from others at the very end, after Werther 
has decided for death. Yet his monomaniacal writing only serves to reveal even more his 
absorption of energy and ideas that are all around him. The more singular his voice 
appears, the more open he is to external influences, both physical and cultural. Indeed, 
what appears to be his voice is often actually direct citation.7 When Werther observes 
someone or thing with whom or which he has sympathy, he often desires to relinquish 
his selfhood and speak as or become the other. His emotional responses to children and 
farmers are well-known examples of how he struggles with cultural delineations and 
boundaries; I highlight here instead his sympathy for, and desire to become, an insect 
and so merge with the natural world. In his very first letter, for example, he describes 
retreating from a certain “Leonore’s” affections, and proclaims a desire to become a 
beetle (cockchafer), and then, as a bug, to “float about in this ocean of fragrance, and 
find in it all the food one needs” (Goethe, Werther 6). The vision of retreat from social 
                                                       
6 Readings of Werther’s self tend to see nature in the novel primarily as a reflection of his internal events 
and feelings, such that human subjectivity overwrites the outer world. Analyses concentrating on 
Werther’s self include Furst, Muenzer, and Swales. 
7 See my discussion (Sullivan) on the extensive citations in Werther. 
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relationships into an insect world predates Kafka’s Metamorphosis, but one can still see 
a similarity in terms of loss of personal agency and escape from social responsibility. 
That Werther, as the middle-class man at the entrance to modernity, rejects cultural 
restraints, economic divisions, and all other boundaries, yet derives his greatest 
satisfaction from a bug-eye’s view is telling. Werther fails socially, and in his quest to 
find harmony with nature, precisely because he expects in both cases to discover a deep, 
harmonic convergence whenever he feels connected regardless of the actual material 
circumstances of his body and his cultural milieu. Seeking immersion into the minutiae 
of the insect world, Werther assumes both that nature is “balanced” and that it pulses in 
harmony with his thoughts and desires. Becoming a bug means, apparently, achieving a 
cosmically creative unity, “Oh Wilhelm,” he cries, “how willingly would I have given up 
my human existence to merge with the wind, or to embrace the torrent! Won’t this 
imprisoned soul some day be released for such bliss?” (Goethe, Werther, 70).  
Merging with the wind and insects is indeed the prototypical Wertherian quest. 
He begins with the wish to immerse himself in nature as he lies next to the lovely 
stream, seeking the insect’s view. “[W]hen I hear the humming of the little world among 
the stalks, and am near the countless indescribable forms of the worms and insects, then 
I feel the presence of the Almighty” (Goethe, Werther 6). His approach to nature shares 
aspects with early ecocriticism, which heavily emphasized sentimentality and 
Romanticism.8 Werther thus not surprisingly rages when trees are indiscriminately 
chopped down, and he spends a great deal of time hiking through the hills and dales 
thinking poetically. But it is not just nature that moves him, it is also Love. Indeed, the 
novel follows a tragic love tale that unfolds within various discussions of nature: 
Werther meets Lotte and loves her, and she loves him; they share a love for sentimental 
nature poetry as well (“Klopstock!” ), yet she is engaged to the hard-working and 
thoroughly bourgeois Albert. She marries Albert whereas Werther seeks solace in work 
and the aristocracy. In dismay at the restrictive class prejudices, he quickly turns back 
to his imagined harmony with nature. At this point, though, nature becomes a horror of 
regurgitating self-destruction, since insect-nature has a dark side: “The universe to me is 
an all-consuming, devouring monster” (Goethe, Werther 37). Even here, Werther 
maintains his preference for the insect-perspective by worrying about how every step 
of a stroll through the woods kills hundreds of tiny bugs. “The most innocent walk 
costs thousands of poor insects their lives; one step destroys the delicate structures of 
the ant and turns a little world into chaos” (Goethe, Werther 37). Werther’s desire to see 
                                                       
8 Werther is best understood as part of Germany’s Storm and Stress era of sentimentality, or 
“Empfindsamkeit,” that builds on Rousseau and Klopstock, and that assumes a spiritual harmony in 
nature; see Rigby. While Goethe’s early works like Werther are often labeled part of “European 
Romanticism” more broadly, there are some significant differences regarding nature. For discussions of 
the volatility and “materiality” of nature in romanticism that differentiate it from earlier movements, see 
especially Oerlemans.  
V
ol 2, N
o 2 
Author: Sullivan, Heather I.;  Title: Nature in a Box: Ecocriticism, Goethe’s Ironic Werther, 
and Unbalanced Nature 
 
235 
© Ecozon@ 2011     ISSN 2171-9594 
with insect eyes or even to be an insect expresses his wish to shape his physical and 
cultural trappings at whim; interestingly enough, this bug-vision reveals a surprisingly 
prescient stance that later becomes more excruciatingly bodily in Kafka and numerous 
cinematic expressions critiquing modernity.9 Overcome by the rather incompatible mix 
of the insect’s perspective as “freedom,” his Messianic delusions , and a burning 
passion for Lotte, Werther finally kills himself with a pistol shot to the head, thereby 
attaining real openness to “nature.” He quite literally opens his mind and body to the 
world. “When the surgeon arrived, Werther was lying on the floor; his pulse beat, but 
his limbs were paralyzed. The bullet had entered the forehead over the right eye; his 
brains were protruding. He was bled in the arm; the blood came, he was still breathing” 
(Goethe, Werther 87). His death lasts twelve hours as he bleeds out, open to the world. 
This final scene suggests that some boundaries can, in fact, be beneficial in the short 
term.  
Much like Werther, Morton’s The Ecological Thought rejects all boundaries. 
Both Werther and Morton celebrate openness, exploded bounds, and, finally, Love. 
Although Morton’s book successfully shakes up many core ideas in environmental 
thinking by questioning, for example, how “nature” is in many ways a capitalistic 
concept derived from exploitation of resources and then imagining an idyllic realm of the 
past, he still sounds much like Werther with his revolutionary cry to transgress all 
boundaries, calling for and locating us in “radical openness.” Morton asks: 
  
Is there such a thing as the environment? Is it everything ‘around’ us? At what point do we 
stop, if at all, drawing the line between environment and non-environment: The atmosphere? 
Earth’s gravitational field? Earth’s magnetic field, without which everything would be scorched 
by solar winds? The sun, without which we wouldn’t be alive at all? The Galaxy? Does the 
environment include or exclude us? Is it natural or artificial, or both? (Morton 10)  
 
His point is well taken, in the sense that he clearly reveals the complexity of 
environmental delineations. We are open systems, interacting with environments, all of 
which flow into each other on a microscopic and cosmic scale. Furthermore, Morton 
shifts from the so-called “web” of ecology to the “mesh” of the universe, which 
“consists of infinite connections and infinitesimal differences” (Morton, 30), and 
thereby brings ecology into postmodernism. In enmeshing us, Morton demonstrates the 
significance of the question of boundaries: “Although there is no absolute, definite 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of beings, we cannot get along without these concepts either. The 
                                                       
9 Besides Kafka’s Gregor Samsa who becomes a large beetle, there is a proliferation in the twentieth 
century of “bug” films and science fiction novels in which human beings become insects or human-insect 
blends, battle aliens who are insect-like, or face bodily infestation of insect creatures such as the “Alien” 
series. These texts express various fears of modernity such as the loss of individuality associated with 
certain political and economic systems, the erasure of bodily boundaries, alienation, commercial 
exploitation in capitalism, etc.  
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mesh is highly paradoxical. Endosymbiosis abolishes inside-outside distinctions. A life 
form must have a boundary for filtering nutrients and poisons. Yet these boundaries are 
not perfectly defined” (Morton 39). He thus mentions that we need bodily bounds, at 
least to “filter nutrients and poisons,” unlike Werther who finally attempts full 
immersion.  
But are bodies merely a filter? They are also themselves ecosystems. After all, 
the E. coli in our intestines require the “solidity” of the intestinal lining to maintain their 
preferred environment even as intestines must be porous in order to allow nutrient 
absorption. Intestinal openings to the world for input and output are quite specific, and 
all complex life depends on intestines remaining otherwise resiliently resistant to too 
much openness. Morton notes the issue of filtering, but seems to overlook the profound 
significance of the actual boundary. Ripping open intestines, for example, opening them 
to the rest of the body, and especially the world, would have disastrous effects on a 
body, and, at the very least, disconcerting effects on the E. coli. While Morton thinks 
concretely about what we do with “shit” culturally, he rather unfortunately neglects the 
advantages of relatively stable intestinal walls, thanks to which, in fact, we are able to 
produce the shit that he so adamantly explores.10 Intestines are a find example of 
specific porosity, by which I mean a partial and temporary yet distinct boundary 
whose openness and steadfast integrity together maintain our existence—however 
briefly.  
Morton indicates his general rejection of boundaries with his derogatory use of 
the term “boxes,” a fact with particular relevance for this discussion of “nature in a 
box.” Achieving “the ecological thought” requires, he claims, that we think openness and 
thus cease to put things in boxes such as the “anything but human” box or the “Gaia 
box,” the “web of life” box, or the “more than human” box (Morton 76). While throwing 
out all the boxes and boundaries, even for bodies, he nevertheless maintains the 
apparently singular “mind” that can be “closed.” Our bodies are “radically open,” but 
apparently we can still have closed minds. Ecological thinking, he writes, “serves as an 
operating system for politics: it doesn’t tell you what to do, exactly, but it opens your 
mind so that you can think clearly about what to do” (Morton 125, emphasis mine). 
Human beings have closed minds that can be opened with or to “the ecological thought.” 
Morton’s ecological thought, in fact, explodes bodily, environmental bounds and yet 
“reserves a special place for the ‘subject’—the mind, the person, even the soul” 
(Morton 113). I note here in contrast the well-known fact that our minds are already 
radically open to other minds and cultural practices via language and ideas, whether we 
                                                       
10 Morton repeatedly addresses the need to know where our shit goes, in response to Lacan. He makes a 
good point, but the thing about excrement is that it is just part of a larger system of food (agriculture, 
transportation, markets, cooking) and our bodies that consume, digest, and slowly move it through the 
intestine. See 32.  
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like it or not, as postmodernism has so definitely indicated and recent studies in brain 
science demonstrate.11 Morton’s sense of open/closed minds operated by appropriate 
“thought” is less radical (and less open) than the eco-phenomenology of David Abram, 
for example, who expands “mind” to include not only the individual organism’s body, 
but also the elements and ecological surroundings that shape each body over a lifetime 
but also throughout evolution. Additionally, our minds are always materially open in 
terms of physical and cognitive responses to caffeine, drugs, medicines, and various 
chemicals, or pollutants, as Alaimo deftly explicates in Bodily Natures. Alaimo, Abram, 
and Goethe document that our minds are not so much open in the seemingly rational 
manner that Morton implies, that is, as something that we can intentionally direct; they 
are instead emergences from open processes of exchange with linguistic, cultural, and, 
equally significant, physical environments. While our bodies and intestines are, in some 
ways, more closed than Morton asserts with his call for “radical openness,” our minds 
might well be even more open as fluid subjectivities.  
Goethe certainly outdoes Morton in regard to exploded subjectivities. Whereas 
Morton just speaks of “opening one’s mind,” Goethe takes that notion all the way to 
its endpoint. Not only does Werther shoot open his skull so that his brain emerges, 
freely, into the world, but his Werther’s subjectivity is precariously open to influences 
from others, nature, and texts. Additionally, his manner of thinking in turn, also flows 
into those around him. He enacts, I would say, Morton’s “radical openness.” Yet that is 
not all—his subjectivity flows even “beyond the text” in that large numbers of young 
men and some women copied Werther around Europe, adopting his clothing style, his 
manner of speaking and thinking, and some even his choice of suicide, so much so that 
Goethe spent the rest of his life trying to say, as he does in the preface to the second 
edition of Werther to “be a man and do not follow me.” Werther lives an activist’s 
dangerous dream: subjectivities are contagious and can unexpectedly cross texts and 
bodies, but often not as one hopes.  
Morton claims that the ecological thought “forces us to invent ways of being 
together that don’t depend on self-interest” (Morton 135). This inspiring assertion 
deserves additional thought. Self-interest can also simultaneously be interest-for-others 
and environments at the same time, since one really cannot think one human being 
without a physical connections and entanglements with others, the environments, and 
the cultural frameworks in which the “self” is enmeshed. In this way, we might rethink 
not “self-interest,” but rather what exactly we mean by “self.” Perhaps “self-interest,” 
as it might be ecologically defined, is a good thing, at least if we understand the self as a 
                                                       
11 See Damasio regarding the brain. Earlier studies also contextualize our “mind” in reference to our 
physical surroundings; see especially Gregory Bateson’s non-dualistic and cybernetic concept, the 
“ecology of mind,” in which the individual human being, his/her culture, and the ecosystem are 
interwoven and interacting systems of complex feedback loops.  
V
ol 2, N
o 2 
Author: Sullivan, Heather I.; Title: Nature in a Box: Ecocriticism, Goethe’s Ironic Werther, 
and Unbalanced Nature 
 
238 
© Ecozon@ 2011     ISSN 2171-9594 
nexus of mesh. Morton concludes the book with the statement that “In the future, we 
will all be thinking the ecological thought. It’s irresistible, like true love” (Morton 135). 
Perhaps the fact that this sounds more like boundless enthusiasm for a Borg-like unity 
of all thinking one thought—resistance is futile—did not occur to Morton. Ecologically 
speaking, diversity has advantages, and one might also advocate for diverse 
“thought.”Also, while ideas are definitely contagious, we cannot easily predict what 
“all” will be thinking, nor if it will be particularly ecological. It may not be, since 
ecological thinking requires a multi-pronged perspective, one able, for example, to think 
open and closed boundaries together, able to think the large and small scales of global 
and local together, and to think about today as part of much longer spans of time as 
well. 
Grappling with the issue of the boundaries and boxes which Morton and 
Werther reject with such animosity may be better formulated in terms of varying scales 
of time and space, and the general concept of unbalanced nature. In the long-term, 
geological timescale, all boundaries are, indeed, erased. Life forms and species exist as 
bounded, short-term delineations perpetuating themselves. For human communities, the 
local is no longer so local, as Heise demonstrates, rather it, too, is imbricated in much 
larger international weather, economic, and agricultural systems so that ecological 
thinking must also be  a global view today. However, our environmental foundation also 
needs to relate to the smaller, humanly-conceivable scope of regional ecosystems in 
order to inspire action and to avoid being overwhelmed by the vast interconnectivity of 
everything, as Patrick Murphy contends. Kate Rigby’s discussions of boundaries in 
terms of regional and national addresses such a spatial issue. She describes the changing 
boundaries in England and other areas in Europe in the 19th century when countryside 
commons and meandering paths were eradicated and replaced by larger, modern 
agricultural divisions and road. This both closed the local walkways between villages, 
isolating them from each other, and yet opened the small villages to the national capital 
at the same time.12 Rigby thus highlights the complexity of boundaries, opening and 
closing them both. Morton, in contrast, takes a more unitary approach, stressing the 
benefits of erasing all boundaries, like a good postmodernist (and, like a good capitalist 
seeking the “open markets” of globalization, though he strongly advocates against many 
other aspects of capitalism), but he neglects the possibility that one might need some 
bounds on occasion. Morton and Werther provide the first step into an appreciation of 
nature, a savoring of the radical idea of our immersion in the endless flows and 
exchanges; but Goethe also takes the next step by providing his readers with Oronaro 
who enacts this dream even as his actions clearly reveal the problematic one-sidedness 
of a vision dominated either by boxes or intensified ruptures. Reading Werther and 
                                                       
12 See Rigby, especially 66-70. 
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Triumph together keeps us appropriately off-balance and aware of our boundaries. 
Indeed, this is just what we need in ecocritical discussions of boundaries: the tension 
merging from the juxtaposition of radical openness , boxes, and unbalanced nature. 
Juxtaposing Goethe’s seriously sentimental Werther with his satirical Triumph 
of Sentimentality maintains both a requisite lack of balance and the ironic aesthetics’ 
multi-pronged perspective. It also offers insights into the messiness of subjectivities 
that are less directional than Morton’s The Ecological Thought. In 1777, just three years 
after the first publication of Werther, Goethe satirized his own international best-seller. 
Triumph is known as a play delineating art and artifice from nature,13 but like Werther it 
is also about the individual’s fate and possibility of self-determination in the face of 
restrictive cultural and natural forces. Both texts also present an unstable character 
dealing with unbalanced nature and the terrible unbalancing of love. In this case, it is a 
marital crisis. King Andrason is displeased that his wife is smitten with Prince Oronaro 
whose sentimental revelry and monodramas are infectious. The king asks his sister’s 
maids to seduce Oronaro so that he can have his wife back. This effort fails since the 
Prince actually loves not the queen but rather a life-size doll resembling her, a doll 
stuffed full of sentimental literature, including Werther and some Rousseau. 
Additionally, Oronaro loves nature, like Werther, but finds it too hot or cold, too damp 
or too dry, filled with bugs and rain and dirt, and even air, and so he has nature 
constructed in his castle where he can revel in its aesthetic beauties without placing 
himself at risk. As his servant, Merkulo, describes it, Oronaro loves nothing more than 
nature, yet his very sensitivity makes him too sensitive:  
 
My prince has such delicate, extremely sensitive nerves, that he must really protect himself from 
the air and the rapid changes during the day. Clearly, one cannot always have things under the 
open sky quite so temperate as one wishes. The dampness of the morning and evening dew is 
considered to be extremely damaging by the doctors, and the scent of moss underneath springs 
on warm summer days is thought to be no less dangerous!14 
 
Of course, unlike Werther, Oronaro loathes the insects, ants, and spiders. Furthermore, 
not to be without his “nature” when travelling, the prince has had the greatest masters 
build boxes to contain bubbling springs, bird song, and moonlight that can be assembled 
on site. These are unpacked to create an indoor grotto with all the amenities of nature, 
except for the cool breezes which are not yet “boxable,” though the French scientists are 
                                                       
13 See especially John P. Heins for a discussion of the aesthetic delineations. 
14 “Mein Prinz ist von so zärtlichen, äußerst empfindsamen Nerven, daß er sich gar sehr vor der Luft, und 
vor schnellen Abwechselungen der Tagezeiten hüten muß. Freilich unter freiem Himmel kann man’s 
nicht immer so temperiert haben, wie man wünscht. Die Feuchtigkeit des Morgen- und Abendtaues 
halten die Leibärzte für höchst schädlich, den Duft des Mooses unter den Quellen bei heißen 
Sommertagen für nicht minder gefährlich!” (82, translation mine).  
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working on it.15 Goethe thus unbalances our expectations: “nature” becomes interior 
decoration, and the cultural artifice of sentimentality becomes a “force of nature.” 
Furthermore, the crux of the play relates to the efforts to decipher the two oracular 
messages, the one to the King and the other to the prince regarding their loves; both 
messages are oddly precise and concrete even though they seem utterly mysterious at 
first. In other words, the “spiritual” wisdom becomes mundane and material, and the 
mundane material becomes aesthetically spiritual. 
All seems well in the sixth and final act of Goethe’s play, (five acts were not 
enough for resolution): the king and queen are reunited, as is the prince with his doll. 
Oronaro maintains his love for artificial, interior nature and the artificial girl; the queen 
sees the folly of sentimentality; and nature remains safely boxable. This suggests a 
reversal of Werther’s reality; for Werther, nature explodes all bounds and he seeks to 
join it. Yet even as both texts play with our misconceptions of nature, they share one 
view on the problem of agency and contagious subjectivities. In the Triumph, the king 
warns the girls who pull the sentimental books out of the doll not to take even a single 
glance, lest their allure overcome them. Indeed, the danger of sentimentality still lurks 
even at the seemingly happy end: both the queen and Oronaro repeat their final lines 
twice, as if they had not recovered from sentimentality but rather have themselves 
become puppets of love. The danger in Goethe’s Triumph of Sentimentality, in other 
words, is that sentimentality will finally triumph despite all efforts to the contrary. 
Putting nature in a box, as the prince does, fails since nature tends to escape 
containment eventually. Yet the metaphor of boxes is quite relevant. While Morton sees 
us successfully opening our minds and thinking our way out of these messes by 
eliminating boxes, Goethe sees subjectivity and nature’s flows as being directed by 
many forces including gravity, the elements, and the insects, of course, but also by 
cultural trends and fashions utterly out of the control of even their authors. That is, 
readers and interpretations of Werther became a force that Goethe could not deter for 
the rest of his life. Subjectivity’s contagion can blaze unexpected and uncontrollable 
paths. Efforts to resist it or direct its course, are often, to cite the Borg yet again, futile. 
Both Werther and Triumph deploy human agency and natural flux as related and unruly 
flows. We human beings have enormous influence on these flows, but rarely with the 
outcomes we intend and imagine. By juxtaposing the exploding boundaries of Werther 
with the closed boxes of Triumph, Goethe shifts the flows of agency. The traditionally 
assumed course moving from “active” human subject to the “passive” world becomes 
                                                       
15 The Prince travels with many “Kasten,” containing “nature.” “Merkulo: ‘Hier führen wir die 
vorzüglichsten Glückseligkeiten empfindsamer Seelen bei uns. In diesem Kasten sind sprudelnde 
Quellen.’ Mana: ‘Oh!’ Merkulo: ‘Hier in diesem ist der Gesang, der lieblichste Gesang der Vögel 
verborgen.’ Mana: ‘Warum nicht gar?’ Merkulo: ‘Und hier in diesem größern ist Mondschein 
eingepackt’” (Goethe, Triumph 84, translation mine). 
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instead multi-directional flows amongst nature, culture, and individuals; in other words, 
a material and metaphorical entanglement of minds, bodies, texts, and world.  
I conclude with three core ideas for ecocriticism in terms of boundaries and 
boxes. First, by juxtaposing Goethe’s Werther with his Triumph of Sentimentality, we 
better understand Goethe as more than a sentimental nature poet. He documents and 
authors many complex polarities, including his sentimental and his “ironic” Werther. 
When armed with this irony, one can see Werther’s inclination to become an insect and 
have a bug-eye’s view as emblematic for modern entanglements within nature and 
culture as inseparable aspects of our environment. Goethe’s two texts contest in 
differing ways our boundaries, so that an active polarity emerges that we most 
productively read with the multi-pronged perspective of ironic aesthetics. Second, it is 
highly relevant for ecocriticism to assess the material boundaries of bodies in terms of 
local and global ecosystems, the political and ideological contestation of all such borders, 
and also their contagious subjectivities. We follow Morton’s plea to acknowledge how 
bodies, ecologies, and subjects are radically open, but we should also embrace and 
maintain the health and stability of our porous yet enclosed intestines, upon which we 
depend during our lifetime (and other ecosystems on which we are reliant). Third, 
understanding unbalanced nature means seeing how all boundaries fade in the long-term, 
cosmic view; yet short-term boundaries allow a steady-state existence far from 
equilibrium, in other words, they allow, with some significance, biological life to exist. 
Straddling these two sides of porous boundaries and stable boundaries allows another 
polarity to emerge, this one also embracing the human body as part of unbalanced nature 
(rather than in opposition to it). To think the juxtaposition is to contend meaningfully 
with the manifold arguments regarding our bodily, environmental, and subjective 
bounds.  
While Goethe doesn’t provide us with simple solutions to our current ecological 
crises, he at least saw clearly the challenges of delineating and re-thinking boundaries. 
And he was not so hasty to throw away the boxes. The ironic image of boxes reminds 
us of the impermanence of our precariously flimsy and yet necessary boundaries that 
contain our internal organs and allow stable maintenance of temperature, pH, etc. 
Erasing these limits can be dangerous, as Werther reveals, but believing in them whole-
heartedly as fully enclosed boxes is also limiting, if not ludicrous, as Oronaro 
demonstrates. On a broader international scope, the elimination of boundaries overlooks 
the obligation to maintain some cultural, physical, and economic limits in the face of 
“opening” global markets as if that were entirely about freedom instead of the 
imposition of specific cultural paradigms (for better or worse). I thus propose boxes as 
a metaphor for the maintenance of material bodies and their habitats, or “nature”: 
porous boxes, open boxes, but boxes nevertheless, boxes that suggest the necessity of 
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bounds to humanity’s hubris of believing that we construct at whim the very material 
and cultural bodies, subjectivities, and spaces we inhabit.   
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